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The term ‘public understanding of science’ has a dual meaning. Firstly, it covers a wide field 
of activities that aims at bringing science closer to the people and to promote public 
understanding of science in the tradition of a public rhetoric of science (see Fuller, 2001 for 
the idea, and OECD, 1997 and Miller et al., 2002 for attempted inventories of such 
initiatives). Secondly, it refers to social research that investigates with empirical methods 
what the public’s understanding of science might be and how this might vary across time and 
context. This includes the conceptual analysis of the term ‘understanding’.  
 
I will concentrate on the latter and focus on the discussions raised by research using large-
scale nationally and internationally representative sample surveys that ask people lists of 
prepared standard questions from a questionnaires instruments. Other forms of enquiries of 
PUS will be covered in different chapters [add cross-reference to other chapters]. I will 
review the changing research agenda by typifying three ‘paradigms’ of PUS research by the 
questions they raised, the interventions they supported and the criticisms they attracted. The 
chapter ends with a short outlook on the potentials for future research and a brief afterthought 
on the ‘public deficit concept’ and survey-based investigations. This review expands on 
previous reviews of the field (Pion & Lipsey, 1981; Wynne, 1995; Miller, 2004).  
 
 
Survey research in public understanding of science 
 
Table 1 lists the main surveys of public understanding of science among the adult populations 
since the 1970s, typically with nationally representative samples of 1000 interviews and more 
in any one context. The lists is not a comprehensive inventory, but it shows the best known 
surveys of scientific literacy, public interests and attitudes to science which are also partially 
comparable: the US National Science Foundation publishes an indicator series since 1979 
(e.g. NSF, 2002), the Eurobarometer (DG Research) series since 1978 covering initially eight 
and recently 32 European countries, the national UK (ESRC, OST, Wellcome Trust) and the 
French series (CEVIPOV; see Boy 1989 and 1993) reaching back to mid 1980s and early 
1970s respectively. The earliest survey of this kind seems to date from 1957, just before 
Sputnik shocked the Western world (Michigan: Withey, 1959). Later efforts came from 
Canada (MST), New Zealand (MST), Malaysia (STIC), India (NCAER), China (MST, 
CAST), Japan (NISTEP), Brazil (CNPq, FAPESP) and Latin America in general (RICYT).  
 
Many relevant surveys that are related to specific and often controversial developments are 
not listed here. For example, over the years the International Social Survey (ISS) consortium, 
Eurobarometer, or national and international polling companies have conducted numerous 
attitude surveys on specific topics related to nuclear energy, computer and information 
technology, the environment, biotechnology and genetic engineering, and most recently 
nanotechnology. Also the ‘busy industry’ of risk analysis has collected numerous samples of 
data on ‘risk perceptions’ of this, that and the other under the sun. Then, there are many 
surveys of adolescents’ understanding of science culminating in the global assessment of 
scientific literacy at school age by OECD-PISA in 2006. They are not included in this review.  
 
However, the fact that a sizable corpus of nationally and internationally comparable survey 
data has accumulated over the past 40 years offers opportunities for secondary analysis, 
dynamic modelling and global comparisons that call for a renewed research effort. A 
complete inventory of relevant national and international surveys of specific topics of science 
and technology remains to be done.  
  Handbook of Public Communication of S&T  
MB LSE 2006 public understanding of science 3 
 
Table 1: the main national surveys of public understanding of science 
 
 
UK F EU Bulgaria US Canada New ZealandJapan India China Malaysia Argentina Brazil
1957 Michigan
1970
1971
1972 CEVIPOV Harvard
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 EB7 EB7 EB7
1978 EB10a EB10a EB10a
1979 NSF
1980
1981
1982 CEVIPOV
1983 NSF
1984
1985 NSF
1986 MORI
1987 CNPq
1988 ESRC CEVIPOV NSF
1989 EB31 EB31 EB31 MST
1990 NSF
1991 NISTEP MST
1992 EB38.1 EB38.1 EB38.1 BAS-IS NSF
1993
1994
1995 NSF CAST
1996 OST/Well BAS-IS
1997 NSF MST CAST
1998
1999 NSF
2000 OST/Well STIC
2001 EB55.2 EB55.2 EB55.2 EB NISTEP CAST
2002
2003 CAST RICYT FAPESP
2004 OST NCAER
2005 EB63.1 EB63.1 EB63.1 EB63.1
2006 NSF-GSS MST  
 
 
‘Paradigms’ of researching the publics of science  
 
Over the last 20 years the public understanding of science has spawned a field of enquiry that 
engages, to a greater or lesser degree, sociology, psychology, history, communication studies, 
and science policy analysis. It remains somewhat marginal but vigorous in its output. Table 2 
below gives a schematic overview of three ‘paradigms’ of research into public understanding 
of science. The table models the relationship between science and the public based on the 
attribution of deficits. Each paradigm has its prime time, and is characterised by a diagnosis 
of the problem that science faces in its relation to the public. A key feature of each paradigm 
is the attribution of a deficit either to the public or to science. Each paradigm pursues 
particular research questions through survey research and offers particular solutions to the 
diagnosed deficit problems.     
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Table 2: Paradigms, Problems and Solutions (source: Bauer et al, 2007) 
 
 Period    Attribution   Strategy 
     Diagnosis   Research 
 
 
 Science Literacy  Public deficit   Measurement of literacy 
     Knowledge   Education 
 1960s – 1985 
 
 
 Public Understanding  Public deficit   Know x attitude 
     Attitudes   Attitude change  
 1985 – 1995       Education 
         Public Relations 
 
 Science & Society  Trust deficit   Participation 
     Expert deficit   Deliberation 
1995 - present  Notions of the public    
     Crisis of confidence  ‘Angels’, mediators 
         Impact evaluation 
 
 
 
Scientific Literacy (1960s – mid 1980s) 
 
Scientific literacy builds on two ideas. Firstly, science education is essentially part of the 
secular drive for basic literacy in reading, writing and numeracy. The second idea is that 
science literacy is a necessary part of civic competence. In a democracy people partake in 
political decisions in one way or the other, either directly through voting and indirectly via 
expressions of public opinion. However, the political animal is only effective if it is also 
familiar with the political process (Althaus, 1998). The assumption is that scientific as well as 
political ignorance breeds alienation and extremism, hence the quest for ‘civic scientific 
literacy’ (Miller, 1998). These ideas highlight the dangers of a cognitive deficit and call for 
more and better science education through the life cycle. However, it also plays to 
technocratic attitudes among elites: the public is de-facto ignorant and therefore disqualified 
from partaking in policy decisions.   
 
An influential definition of ‘science literacy’ was proposed by Jon D Miller (1983 and 1992). 
It includes four elements: (a) knowledge of basic textbook facts of science, (b) an 
understanding of methods such as probability reasoning and experimental design, (c) an 
appreciation of the positive outcomes of science and technology for society, and (d) the 
rejection of ‘superstition’. Miller developed these literacy indicators from earlier work 
(Withey, 1959; see also the review of Etzioni & Nunn, 1976) supported by the US National 
Science Foundation (NSF). Between 1979 and 2001 NSF undertook a bi-annual audit of the 
nation’s scientific literacy with representative surveys of the adult population. Similar efforts, 
but less regular, came in Europe in the 1980s, and since also elsewhere (see table 1 above).  
 
The research agenda 
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Knowledge is the key problem of this paradigm, and it is measured by quiz-like items (see 
famous examples in table 3). Respondents are asked to decide whether a statement of a 
scientific fact was true or false. Some of these items became notorious, travelled far and hit 
the news headlines, not least because of their scandal value.  
 
Table 3: Examples of knowledge and attitude items in literacy research 
 
 
Knowledge items  
 
Item 1. ‘Does the earth go around the sun or does the sun go around the earth? (the earth 
goes around the sun; the sun goes around the earth; dk).  
Item 2. ‘The centre of the earth is very hot’ (true, false, dk) 
Item 3. ‘Electrons are smaller than atoms’ (true, false, dk) 
Item 4. ‘Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria’ (true, false, dk) 
Item 5: ‘The earliest humans lived at the same time as the dinosaurs’ (true, false, dk) 
 
Attitude items (Likert scales)  
 
Item 6: ‘Science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more comfortable’ 
(agree = positive)  
Item 7: ‘The benefits of science are greater than any harmful effects’ (agree = positive) 
Item 8: ‘We depend too much on science and not enough on faith’ (disagree = positive) 
 
1 strongly agree; 
2 agree to some extent;  
3 neither/nor; 
4 disagree to some extent; 
5 strongly disagree;  
 
9 don’t know (DK).   
 
Source: e.g. Eurobarometer 31 of 1989. 
 
Respondents score a point for every correct answer (as highlighted in table 3). It is a problem 
to find short and unambiguous statements that have one correct and authoritative answer, and 
to balance easy and difficult items and from different fields of science. The responses to these 
items, often between 10 or 20, must be correlated to form a reliable index of knowledge. 
Research involves the construction of such items and the testing of their scalar value; 
‘constructing’ is the right word because finding and testing such items is a bit like brick 
laying, it has to stand up in the end. Recently item response theory is brought into the 
discussion for this purpose (Miller & Pardo, 2000). As indicators these items are only reliable 
in combination; any isolated single item has little significance. But, also in batteries the 
reliability of these scales is an issue (Pardo & Calvo, 2004). However, public speakers and 
the mass media repeatedly pick out stand-alone items as indicators of public ignorance and 
reasons for public alarm. For example, the item about the sun and the earth (item 1 above in 
table 2) has seen many citations out of context.1      
 
What counts as scientific knowledge? Miller suggested two dimensions: facts and methods. 
This stimulated efforts to measure people’s understanding of probability reasoning,  
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experimental design, the importance of theory and hypothesis testing. Critics have argued that 
the essence of science is process and not facts (e.g. Collins & Pinch, 1993). Therefore topics 
like theory testing, probability and uncertainty, peer reviewing, scientific controversies, and 
the need to replicate experiments should be included in the assessment of literacy. Scales of 
methodological knowledge are more challenging to construct, and if employed still only 
based on very few items. An open question suggested by Withey (1959) proofed to be useful: 
‘Tell me in your own words, what does it mean to study something scientifically'. 
Respondents’ answers are coded for methodological and institutional awareness. However, 
the coding remains controversial: normative or descriptive (see Bauer & Schoon, 1993)? 
Process also includes awareness of scientific institutions and its procedures, what Prewitt 
(1983) called ‘scientific savvy’ and Wynne (1996) called the ‘body language’ of science. The 
latter dimension has received some attention in explorative studies but waits to be 
implemented in international surveys (see Bauer, Petkova & Boyadjjewa, 2000 and Sturgis 
and Allum 2004).     
 
Researchers also looked at the ‘don’t know’ (DK) responses to knowledge items and revealed 
ambiguity in self-attributed ignorance. Comparing incorrect responses and DK-responses 
suggests an index of confidence: women and some social milieus consistently prefer 
declaring ignorance rather than guessing as they are less confidence to opine on science 
(Bauer, 1996). Turner & Michael (1996) described four qualitative types of admitted 
ignorance: embarrassment ‘I go and find a book in the library’; self-identity ‘I am not very 
scientific’; division of labour ‘I know somebody who knows’; smugness ‘I couldn’t care 
less’. Sudden changes in the rates of DK-responses over time might also indicate 
methodological issues: survey companies can alter their interviewer protocol, accept a DK as 
an answer or probe further. The latter reduces the rate of DK. Such changes might reflect a 
change of fieldwork contractor, like in the case of Eurobarometer, over the years.   
 
Many countries have undertaken audits of adult scientific literacy. The US NSF has presented 
bi-annual ‘horse race’ type rankings of different countries on literacy to answer the question: 
where does the US stand? A key problem of such comparisons remains the fairness of the 
indicators. The existing set of knowledge items are biased with regards to the national science 
base. Countries tends to a historically specialised science base, or a corps of scientific heroes 
from one rather than the other discipline, and literacy scores are likely to reflect this 
particular science base (e.g. Shukla, 2005; Raza et al, 1996 and 2002). Raza and his 
colleagues’ suggestions for culturally fair indication and analysis deserves more attention 
than it has received hitherto.   
 
What is to be done? 
 
The literacy paradigm is fixated on the cognitive deficit. Interventions are seen mainly in 
public education. Literacy is a matter for continued education, requires renewed attention in 
the schools’ curricula and on the part of a publicly responsible mass media that is called to 
task (see e.g. Royal Society, 1985).  
 
Critique 
 
The critique of the literacy paradigm focuses on conceptual as well as empirical issues. Why 
should science knowledge qualify for special attention? What about historical, financial or 
legal literacy? The case for ‘science literacy’ needs to be made in competition to other types 
of literacy.  
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Secondly, is literacy a continuum or a threshold measure? Miller originally envisaged a 
threshold measure. To qualify as a member of the ‘attentive public for science’ one needs to 
command ‘some minimal level’ of literacy, be interested and feel informed about science and 
technology, appreciate some positive outcomes, and renounce superstitions. However, the 
definition of this ‘minimal level of literacy’ changed from audit to audit, and it is unclear 
whether the reported changes, or for that matter the lack of changes (Miller, 2004), reflects 
changes in definition or in substance (see Beveridge & Rudell, 1998).  
 
Thirdly, critics argued that indicators of ‘textbook knowledge’ are irrelevant and empirical 
artefacts. Of real importance is knowledge-in-context that emerges from local controversies 
and people concerns (Ziman, 1991; Irvin & Wynne, 1996). However, what accounts for the 
consistent correlations between measures of literacy, attitudes and socio-demographic 
variables? We must recognise a certain intellectual failure to engage with these robust results.   
 
Fourthly, there is the question of ‘superstitions’. Does belief in astrology disqualify a member 
of the public from being scientifically literate, as Miller (1983) suggested? The co-existence 
of superstition and scientific literacy is an empirical matter. Astrology and scientific practice 
serve different functions in life. To make the ‘rejection of astrology’ a criterion of literacy 
bars us from understanding the tolerance or intolerance between science and astrology in 
everyday life, which is a cultural variable (see Boy & Michelat, 1986; Bauer & Durant, 
1997).   
 
Knowledge items can be controversial in substance. So for example physicists might point 
out that whether ‘electrons are smaller than atoms’ cannot be determined in general but 
depends on circumstances. Thus the authoritative answer to this questions is more shaky than 
one would like to admit. But one will be able to life with a generally correct textbook answer. 
However, more problematic is the statement ‘The earliest humans lived at the same time as 
the dinosaurs’, which according to biology textbooks is ‘false’ to be correct. This item 
captures, in particular in the US, a debate over evolutionary theory which, but by now means 
globally, clashes with fundamentalist religious culture (see Miller et al, 2006). It is thus not 
entirely clear whether this item is to be treated as an indicator of science literacy or of 
cultural values; this will depend on the context.   
 
Finally, it is suggested that the concern with literacy is correlated with the crisis of legitimacy 
of ‘big science’. To overcome this crisis by literacy assumes a fundamental gap in the 
operations of literate scientists and an illiterate public, for which there is little evidence 
beyond elitist prejudice. Furthermore, if Roger Bacon’s notion of ‘knowledge = power’ 
holds, any attempt to share knowledge without simultaneous public empowerment will create 
alienation rather than rapprochement between science and the public. Literacy is therefore the 
wrong answer to what many see as a crisis of legitimacy and trust (Roqueplo, 1974; Fuller, 
2000).   
 
 
Public Understanding of Science (1985 – mid 1990s) 
 
New concerns emerge under the title public understanding of science (PUS).2 In the UK this 
is marked by an internationally influential report of the Royal Society of London with that 
very title (Royal Society, 1985). PUS inherits the notion of a public deficit, however, now it 
is the attitudinal deficit that is fore-grounded (Bodmer, 1987). The public is not sufficiently 
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positive about science and technology, too sceptical or even outright anti-science. This must 
be of major concern to scientific institutions like the Royal Society. Old and new good 
reasons for the public appreciation of science are put forward: it is important for making 
informed consumer choices; it enhances the competitiveness of industry and commerce; and 
it is part of national tradition and culture (see Thomas & Durant, 1987; Gregory & Miller 
1998; Felt, 2000). The Royal Society of London famously assumed that more public 
knowledge will ‘cause’ more positive attitudes. Hence, the axiom of PUS became: ‘the more 
they know, the more they love it’.  
 
Research agenda 
 
The evaluative appreciation of science is mostly measured by Likert-type attitude scales. 
Respondents agree or disagree to evaluative statements and thereby express their positive or 
negative attitude towards science (see table 3 for some famous examples). Some statements, 
in order to assess a positive attitude, require the respondent to disagree, others to agree, 
depending on the formulation. This mixed tactic avoids the acquiescence response bias, i.e. 
the general tendency to agree to such questions in the artificial context of survey interviews. 
Another related issue is how to deal with ‘neither/nor’ and DK options. Not offering a 
‘neither/nor’ may increase the variance in the data, but forces people into positions which 
they do not hold. This would leave no space to express real ambivalence, genuinely 
motivated abstention of judgement, or the absence of opinion. There must be space for the 
‘idiot’, i.e. in ancient Greece the one that does not have an opinion in public (on the recent 
revaluation of the ‘idiot’ see Lezaun & Soneryd, 2006) .  
 
Research on science attitudes is concerned with ‘acquiescence response bias’, the 
construction of reliable scales, the multi-dimensional structure of attitudes (e.g. Pardo & 
Calvo, 2002), the relationship between general attitudes and specific attitudes (Daamen & 
vanderLans, 1995), context effects of previous questions (e.g. Gaskell, Wright & 
O’Muircheartaigh, 1993), the comparative effects of web-based or telephone interviewing on 
the response variance (Fricker et al. 2005), and most importantly the relationship between 
knowledge and attitudes. The concern for literacy carried over into PUS, as knowledge 
measures are needed to test the expectation ‘the more they know, the more they love it’. 
However, the emphasis shifts from a threshold measure to that of a continuum of knowledge. 
One is either literate or not, but more or less knowledgeable (Durant, Evans & Thomas, 
1989).  
 
A potential gender gap in attitudes to science attracts attention and concerns. Breakwell and 
Robertson (2001) found that British girls are less inclined towards science than boys and this 
gap is unchanged between 1987 and 1998. Sturgis and Allum (2001) highlight the importance 
of a knowledge gap between men and women in explaining this attitude gap, when 
controlling for other factors. Eqaully, Crettaz (2004) shows for Switzerland of 2000 that 
gender does not explain attitudinal differences between men and women; it is science literacy 
and general education that makes all the difference.  
 
The second PUS paradigm extended the range of concepts, methods and data. Mass media 
monitoring, in particular of newspapers, is cost effective and easily extended backward in 
time and updated into the present. The changing salience and the framing of science in the 
mass media offer alterative indicators of science in public (see Bauer, 2000; Bauer et al, 
1995). Such analyses reveal long-term cycles and trends, such as the return to the 
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medicalisation of science news, over the last 100 years (Bauer et al. 2006; Bucchi & 
Mazzolini, 2003; Bauer, 1998a; LaFollette, 1990).    
 
What is to be done? 
 
The practical interventions of the PUS paradigm might be divided into a rationalist and a 
realist agenda. Both agree with the diagnosis of an attitudinal deficit, the public is 
insufficiently infatuated with science and technology, but they disagree on what to do about 
it.  
 
For the rationalist, public attitudes are a product of information processing with a cognitive-
rational core. Hence, negative attitudes towards science - or unreasonable risk perceptions as 
is the fashionable concept of the 1990s – are caused by insufficient information, or they are 
based on heuristics, such as availability or small sample evidence, that bias the public’s 
judgement of science and technology. It is the assumption that, had people all the information 
and operated without these heuristics, they would display more positive judgements of 
scientific developments. Thus, they would agree with experts, who do not succumb to these 
biases as easily as the public does. People need more information and training on how to 
avoid faulty information processing. The battle for the public is thus a battle for rational 
minds with the weapons of information and training in probability and statistics.  
 
For the realist, attitudes express emotional relations with the world. Realists work the 
emotions and appeal to people’s desires and gut reactions, and thus follow the logic of 
advertising and propaganda. In what is seen as the battle for the hearts of the public, the key 
question is: how can we make science ‘sexy’? The ‘consumer’ public is to be seduced rather 
than rationally persuaded. According to this logic, there is little difference between science 
and washing powder (see critically Michael, 1998). This agenda includes research on market 
segmentation, consumer profiling, and targeted campaigning in different segments of the 
public. British science consumers are divided into six groups with different demographic 
profiles (OST, 2000): confident believers, technophiles, supporters, concerned, the ‘not sure’, 
and the ‘not for me’. A similar segmentation was developed in a recent Portuguese study 
(Costa, Avila & Mateus, 2002).  
 
 
Critique 
 
Attitudes need to be understood on a background of representations. Representations become 
visible when everyday common sense is challenged by novelty; they familiarises the 
unfamiliar (Farr, 1993; Wagner, 2007). This outlook shifts the research from rank ordering 
people by attitudes to characterising their representations of science in function of different 
life contexts (e.g. Boy, 1989; Bauer &  Schoon, 1992; Durant, Evans & Thomas, 1992). 
Studying representations of science opens the door widely to other data streams, in particular 
qualitative enquiries (Jovchelovitch, 1996; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 2005).  
 
The critique of deficit models correctly highlighted the pitfalls of reifying ‘knowledge’ in the 
knowledge survey – scientific knowledge is what survey measure – and insisted on 
knowledge-in-context (Ziman, 1991) and on analysing how experts relate to the public (Irvin 
& Wynne, 1996). Wynne (1993) used the term ‘institutional neuroticism’ to point at 
prejudices of scientific actors towards the public that create a self-fulfilling prophecy and a 
vicious circle: the public, cognitively and emotionally deficient, cannot be trusted. However, 
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this mistrust by scientific actors will be paid back in kind by public mistrust. Negative public 
attitudes then confirm the assumptions of scientists: the public is not to be trusted. This 
circularity of the ‘institutional unconscious’ calls for ‘soul searching’, i.e. reflexivity among 
scientific actors, and even endorsement of a post-modern epistemology of a plurality of 
knowledge centres.  
 
The empirical critique of the paradigm focuses on the relation of interest, attitudes and 
knowledge. The correlation between knowledge and attitudes becomes a focus of research 
(Evans & Durant, 1989; Einsiedel, 1994; Durant et al, 2000). The results remain inconclusive 
until recently (see Allum et al, 2008): overall, large scale surveys show a small positive 
correlation of knowledge and positive attitudes, but they also show larger variance among the 
knowledgeable, and this correlation is variable. However, on controversial science topics, the 
correlation approaches zero. Thus not all informed citizens are also enthusiastic about all 
science and technology; for some developments, in particular controversial ones, ‘familiarity 
can breed contempt’. In hindsight, it is surprising that anybody ever expected this to be 
different. 
The concept and measurement of attitudes is the traditional remit of social psychology (e.g. 
Eagly & Cheiken, 1993). In classical theory cognitive elaboration is not a factor of positive 
attitudes but an indicator of their quality: knowledge fortifies the attitude to resist influence 
and makes it more predictive of behaviour whatever its direction (Pomerantz et al., 1995). 
What emerges, though, is that knowledge and information matter but not in the way common 
sense assumes. It is not normal that better informed citizens have more positive attitudes, or 
that poorly and well informed citizens equally stick to their views.  
 
Many PUS surveys also measure the people’s interest in science. Eurobarometer surveys 
suggest that self-reported interest is falling over time, while knowledge is increasing (Miller 
et al., 2002). This trend, if verified, would show that “familiarity breeds disinterest”, thus 
touching another naïve assumption of the Literacy and PUS paradigms: the ‘more we know, 
the more we are interested’.     
 
 
Science in-and-of Society (mid 1990s to present) 
 
The polemical critique of the ‘public deficit models’ ushered in a reversal of the attribution. 
The public deficit of trust is mirrored by a deficit on the part of science and technology and 
its representatives. The focus of attention shifts to the deficit of the scientific expert: their 
prejudices of the public.   
 
Diagnosis 
 
Evidence of negative attitudes from large scale surveys is contextualised with focus group 
research and in quasi-ethnographic observations and re-interpreted as a ‘crisis of confidence’ 
(House of Lords, 2000; Miller, 2001). Science and technology operate in society and 
therefore stand relative to other sectors of society. The views of the public held by scientific 
experts come under scrutiny. Prejudices of the public operate in policy making and guide 
communication efforts, and these alienate the public. The decline in trust of the public vis-à-
vis science also indicates the revival of an enlightenment notion of a sceptical but informed 
public opinion (Bensaude-Vincent, 2001).  
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What is to be done? 
 
Writings on the new governance of science admonish more public involvement and a new 
deal between science and society (e.g. Fuller, 2000; Jasanoff, 2005). For the ‘Science and 
Society’ paradigm the distinction between research and intervention blurs. Many are 
committed to action researcher who reject the separation of analysis and intervention. This 
agenda, academically grounded as it may be, often ends in political consultancy with a very 
pragmatic outlook. Explicit and implicit notions of the public, public opinion and public 
sphere, are reported back as ‘theories espoused’ and ‘theories-in-action’ (Argyris & Schon, 
1978) to stimulate reflective change of mind among these scientific actors. Thus, the bulk of 
activity under science and society fuses research and consultancy, and most of the evidence 
remains grey literature and informal conversation.  
 
Advise proliferates on how to rebuild public trust by addressing its paradoxes: trust is 
relational; once it is on the cards, trust is already lost; trust cannot be engineered, it is granted 
to who deserves it (see Luhmann, 1979). Public participation is the Prince’s way to rebuild 
public trust: the House of Lords Report (2000) lists many forms of deliberative activities 
such as citizen juries, deliberative opinion polling, consensus conferencing, national debates, 
hearings etc. Essay writings order and describe the virtues, the experience and the know-how 
of these exercises of public deliberations (e.g. Gregory et al, 2007; Abels & Bora, 2004; Joss 
& Belluci, 2002; Einsiedel, Jelsoe & Breck, 2001; Seargent & Steel, 1998).   
 
 
Critique 
 
Deliberative activities are time consuming, require know-how, and they are thus increasingly 
outsourced to a newly forming private sector of professional ‘angels’. Angels are age-old 
mediators; in this context not between Heaven and Earth, but between a disenchanted public 
and the institutions of science, industry and policy making. For the utilitarian spirit of politics 
the democratic ethos is not sufficient. Does the deliberation process pay off? is a pertinent 
question.  Also the private sector of outsourced professional ‘angels’ makes claims and offers 
‘deliberation services’, often with spurious product differentiations, which requires some kind 
of critical ‘consumer’ testing.  
 
The answer to the audit problem requires process and impact measures. Researchers therefore 
advocate quasi-experimental evaluations of deliberative events and suggest process and 
outcome indicators (see Rowe & Frewer, 2004; Butschi & Nentwich, 2002) including 
indicators such as changing public literacy and attitudes.  
 
This call for indicators of the public, and for media monitoring of the events, runs the risk of 
reinventing the wheel, albeit this time for a different car: to evaluate the ‘angels’ and their 
services. The re-entry of concerns for PUS by the backdoor of impact evaluation research of 
public deliberation is ironic but unavoidable. The analysis of costs and benefits needs a 
metric.3 It may be that changes in media reportage, public knowledge, interests and attitudes 
offer that metric to audit the moderators of public audits. After all, we live in an ‘audit 
society’ (see Power, 1999).  
 
An brief afterthought on an ‘urban myth’:  public deficits and survey research   
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PUS survey research has at times been hampered by a polemic association of the ‘deficit 
concept’ with survey research. This polemic is reminiscent of an older one, namely 
Lazarsfeld’s (1941) debate with Adorno over ‘administrative’ and ‘Critical’ research, but 
with a curious methodological fixation.4 As the polemic has it: the PUS survey researcher is a 
‘positivist’ who constructs the ‘public deficit’ of knowledge, attitude and trust to please her 
sponsors in government, business or learned societies. Thus, surveys serve existing powers to 
control their anxieties over public opinion. By contrast the ‘Critical-constructivist’ researcher 
will recognise this ideological entanglement and will use exclusively qualitative data. The 
achieved reflexivity will open his sponsors to a change of mind. ‘Critical’ qualitative research 
emancipates the public from the grip of elite prejudice. Where doxa reigns, there shall be 
logos. Be that as it may; so or similar goes the story. Problematic in all this is not the 
differentiation of knowledge interests, nor the move from prejudice to enlightenment, but the 
exclusive identification of knowledge interest and method protocol:  
 
Survey research = positivist = anxious, de-contextual prejudice 
Qualitative research = Critical-constructivist = contextual insight.  
 
These implicit equations are of unclear origin like any urban myth, but probably arose from 
the influential British research programme on PUS of the late 1980s. In his handbook review 
of PUS research, Brian Wynne associated survey research and anxious elite prejudice and 
contrasted both to the alternative ‘constructivists research’:  
 
‘large-scale social surveys of public attitudes toward and understanding of science 
inevitably build in certain normative assumptions about the public, about what is 
meant by science and scientific knowledge, and about understanding. They may often 
therefore reinforce the syndrome [anxiety among social elites about maintaining 
social control, p361], in which the public, and not science or scientific culture and 
institutions are problematised…. The survey methods by its nature decontextualises 
knowledge and understanding and imposes assumptions .. (Wynne, 1995, p370).  
 
Such formulations, together with the book that came to summarise the British research effort 
of the late 1980s (Irwin & Wynne, 1996), framed an unhelpful polemic, and without 
intentions to that effect.5 But, whereas Lazarsfeld invited convergence with Adorno, here the 
survey method is stigmatised by methodological boundary work (see Giryn, 1999). The 
intrinsic association of sample surveys and elite anxieties and the control of public opinion is 
a logical fallacy, historically unfounded, and unduly restrictive of social research (see 
Kallerud & Ramberg, 2002; Bauer, Gaskell & Allum, 2000). The abuse of survey data is 
clearly possible and documented by the polemic, which is an achievement to be appreciated. 
But the misuse of an instrument does not exhaust its potential. The intrinsic identification of 
data protocol and knowledge interest ignores the functional autonomy of motives, and the 
‘interpretive flexibility’ of instruments. Generally, motive and behaviour stream are flexibly 
linked, and this goes for knowledge interest and method protocols, and also for survey 
research. Ironically, ‘Critical’ qualitative research is increasingly adopted by powerful 
sponsors, which absorbs much of the critical edge. After all, it is difficult to see why 
qualitative research should be immune to this type of incorporation. Nevertheless, we need to 
break with the stigma of survey research among PUS researchers and sponsors to liberate and 
expand the agenda for future research.  
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Where to go from here?   
 
Progress in PUS research is modest as it seems: few new questions, but much new discourses. 
None of the new discourses made the previous ones obsolete. PUS preserves the relevance of 
literacy measurement and adds the attitudes. Science and Society, whilst rejecting the public 
deficit models, cannot, once consolidated, avoid the thorny problem of auditing, and 
ironically reinvents the old measures of the public. However, the focus is no longer the 
public’s deficit, but the performance of the mediating ‘angels’ who spend public money to 
resolve the crisis of public confidence in science and technology.  
 
Equally promising it the OECD assessment cycles of educational achievements (PISA), 
which in 2006 focused on ‘scientific literacy’ and will do again in 2015, albeit for children in 
schooling age. These results create large and detailed databases across many countries even 
beyond the OECD, and might also re-launch the discussions over adult literacy in these 
contexts.  
 
In tracing the recent history of PUS research I both appreciated and deplored the ‘deficit 
concept’ in PUS research. In order to capitalise on the opportunities that arise from a global 
corpus of survey data that has accumulated over the past 40 years, we need to reopen the 
research agenda. We need to ignore a misguided stigma of survey research as a ride on public 
deficiency, and take it for what it really is: a powerful and ‘movable immobile’ representation 
of public opinion. Achieving this, I am confident that this field of research will enter its most 
fertile period, yet. Public understanding of science is an historical process. One-off point 
observations, i.e. the occasional survey or focus group, might have news and scandal value, 
but it is not a valid analysis of the historical dynamic. Now it is time to be ambitious again 
(see Bauer at al., 2007): let researchers come together with new efforts 
 
 To integrate the different national and international surveys as far as possible into a 
global database, maybe under EU, WORLD BANK, UNESCO, OECD or UN flag 
and in collaboration with existing social science data archive;  
 To encourage sophisticated secondary analysis and the continued documentation of 
this growing database;  
 To construct dynamic models of public understanding of science over time, including 
cohort analytic and quasi-panel models, and test these in different contexts;  
 To work towards global indicators of a ‘culture of science’ based on these surveys;  
 To seriously commit to and develop alternative data streams such as mass media 
monitoring and longitudinal qualitative research efforts.  
 
May the funding agencies and ambitious young researchers see the light at the horizon!   
 
 
 
Resources 
 
Some national institutions that have sponsored or conducted PUS surveys 
 
BAS-IS  Bulgarian Academy of Science, Institute of Sociology, Sofia 
CNPq   Brazilian National Research Foundation 
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CEVIPOV  Centre for the Study of Political Life, SciencePo, Paris 
EB, Eurobarometer DG-12, later DG Research, Brussels 
ESRC   Economic and Social Research Council, UK 
FAPESP  Research Foundation of the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil 
ISS   International Social Survey consortium  
MORI   British public opinion research company 
NSF    US National Science Foundation, Washington, Science Indicators 
NISTEP  National Institute of Science and Technology Policy, Japan 
NISTED   National Institute of Science, Technology and Development, India 
NCAER  National Centre for Applied Economic Research, Delhi, India 
MST   Ministry of Science and Technology (Canada, China, Brazil) 
Wellcome Trust Research Foundation interested in PUS, London 
RICYT  Latin American Network for Science Indicators [cpolino@ricyt.edu.ar] 
CAST    China Academy of Sciences and Technology 
OST   Office of Science and Technology, London 
PISA   Programme for International Student Assessment, OECD, Paris 
STIC   Strategic Thrust Implementation Committee, Malaysia 
 
 
Relevant Journals where PUS survey research is reported: 
 
 Public Understanding of Science 
 Science Technology and Human Values 
 Science Communication 
 Public Opinion Quarterly 
 International Journal of Public Opinion Research 
 Risk analysis 
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1 It would be an interesting study to trace the reception and use of these items in public discourse. I am not 
aware of any study analysing the reception of PUS surveys. This would amount to an interesting analysis of the 
rhetoric and pragmatics of survey research.  
2  PUS was also extended to PUST to include ‘T’ for technology, PUSTE to include ‘E’ for engineering, or 
PUSH to include ‘H’ for the humanities, the latter indicating a more continental understanding of ‘science’ as 
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‘Wissenschaft’. The dating of these phases is liberal follows mainly the influential UK experience. In the US all 
through the 1970s the AAAS had a standing Committee on Public Understanding of Science (see Kohlstedt, 
Sokal & Lewenstein, 1999, p 140ff.  
3 in the UK for example, the large scale GM Nation debate of 2002 cost the government close to £1 Million. A 
simple survey of public attitudes would cost around £50-100,000, a round of focus group session £25,000. Such 
cost differentials have to be justified with added value.  
4 I use the capital ‘C’ to indicate this posture of foundational critique. It is hard to imagine how a critical mind 
could be the privilege of only on one side of this polemic. And, this dichotomy is already a simplification of a 
more complex issue which Habermas (1978) caught with the trichotomy of technical-instrumental, practical-
normative, and Critical-emancipatory interests of human knowledge. 
5 A historical note: In the UK, the ESRC funded a research programme ‘public understanding of science’ from 
1987-1990 (See Ziman, 1992) with 11 different projects. I joined this effort in 1989 as a ‘number cruncher’ for 
John Durant, then at the Science Museum in London. I happened to join the national survey project and recall 
how some members of the research programme were hardly on speaking terms. Curiously, the fault line fell on 
whether a team would use a numerical or a qualitative protocol for their observations. The later publication 
(Irwin & Wynne, 1996), that became the summary of this programme, ‘excluded’ the three projects with 
numerical data: the survey of the British adult population (see Durant et al., 1989 and 1992), the survey of 
British children (see Breakwell & Robertson, 2001), and the analysis of mass media reportage of science (see 
Hansen & Dickinson, 1992). Alan Irwin recalls (personal communication, January 2007) that the book was 
intended to counter-balance the over-whelming publicity which the survey of 1988 generated through its 
NATURE piece (Durant et al. 1989), and was not as a statement against quantitative or survey research. But he 
admitted that an ‘urban myth’ might have developed in the subsequent reception, not least because the anti-
survey polemic resonated with the issue of quantitative and qualitative methodology in the social sciences 
generally, and the myth might have served the boundary work during the competition over national and 
European funding steams.   
